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Towards a multi-bilateral enlargement policy?
German assistance to Central and Eastern Europe at the crossroads
with European aid programs.
Summary
Since a few years, a lively debate has taken place on whether European regionalisation
process contributes to a decline or a restructuring of the nation state. In this article, the case of
German assistance to Central and Eastern European countries (CEEC) will help analysing
how national external policies evolve and adapt to a new integrative environment. The
eastwards enlargement of the European Union will be the general framework for making the
interdisciplinary link between foreign policy and European questions. As we argue that the
enlargement is a sui generis process, one way to analyse the restructuring state is making
sociology of the German federal field of aid. Drawing on the literature on social
constructivism, sociological institutionalism and sociology of elites, we adopt two variables
(identity norms and institutions), which have to be tested in order to understand structural and
relational power (S. Strange) among actors involved in national/bilateral (Transform program)
and European/multilateral projects (Phare/Twinning). As a result, we contribute to the debate
on governance, as we observe that German cooperative federalism is particularly put into
question, we argue that a multi-bilateral policy towards CEEC is in fact taking shape.2
Since a few years, a lively debate has taken place on whether European regionalisation
process contributes to a restructuring of the nation state. Originally, the debate started on a
theoretical basis, and then engaged into a proliferation of sector-oriented case studies in order
to understand the “nature of the beast” (T. Risse, 1995). It is divided into two main groups,
proponents of a progressively disappearing state and proponents of a restructuring state
1. Most
of this literature however focuses on politics, polity or common policy processes, i.e.
European Union’s (EU) internal questions, and does not ask to what extend, for example,
national foreign policies or external relations also evolve in this context. Scholars of
international relations, of foreign policy analysis and of international political economy, for
their part mainly focused on the phenomenon of the “retreat of the state” (S. Strange, 1996),
and on understanding change and continuity of state’s policies after the end of bi-polarity
(Rittberger et al., 1996). Apart from exceptions, only few of them did really focus on
analysing the intertwinned evolution of the regional construction on the one hand, and of the
member states on the other. In this article, the enlargement process of the European Union
will be the general framework for studying the interdisciplinary link between foreign policy
2
and European questions, and analysing how national external policies evolve and adapt to a
new integrative environment. We choose German assistance policy to Central and Eastern
European countries (CEEC) as a case study in order to show more precise results.
German foreign relations with Central and Eastern European countries (CEEC), and in
particular German foreign aid (or assistance) to these countries, is an interesting case in a
manifold perspective:
- On a historical basis, it is a way to analyse how German governments of the 1990’s faced
the question of Germany’s responsibility to CEEC.
- It helps analysing how national and European policies become interlocking ones. How does
the German federal state cope with the development of the Länder’s own external relations
within the enlarging Europe?
1 For a summary of the debate, see Wallace William (1994), “Rescue or Retreat? The Nation State in Western Europe,
1945-93”, Political Studies, (42), Special issue, pp. 42-76.
2 For a review of the literature on foreign policy, see Hudson Valerie M., Vore Christopher S. (1995), “Foreign Policy
Analysis Yesterday, Today, and Tomorrow”, Mershon International Studies Review, 39, supp. 2, oct., pp. 209-
238.3
- Finally, it is a way to understand how far foreign aid effectively helps restructuring CEE
states’ infrastructure and takes part in the building to the necessary networks and coalitions of
a future enlarged Europe.
To sum up, is the regressing of the federal budget (annex 1) of German assistance to be
explained as a decline of national external policy or as a sign that the German state - although
recovering its full sovereignty in the 1990s -, is restructuring in order to take the supra-
national level into account?
More theoretically, as we are interested to understand how far the end of bi-polarity changed
the nature of the nation-state, the guiding questions of this article will be following:
Can one speak of the decline of the national foreign policies of EU member states or rather
of a restructuring of these policies which take European questions into account? What are
the effective interlocking processes between the national and European levels, and how can
they be analysed?
We will argue that a multi-bilateral enlargement policy is actually taking shape. Because it is
a sui generis process, polity and politics of aid reflect the conflicts and arrangements that
occur between European institutions - in particular the European Commission - and national
actors and institutions in the struggle for legitimacy. We will adopt a pluralist definition of
the state. Pluralist authors are critical to what used to be the main paradigm in international
relations, i. e. realism. They define the state as a complex ensemble comprising different
institutions, practices and coercive administrative forms
3, which are embedded into a social
context
4. The purpose of this study is to understand, in a social constructivist perspective,
what are the logics underpinning the interlocking processes taking place between national and
European policies in the framework of the EU enlargement, and how the diffusion of power
5
3 See Fred Halliday (1994). For Philip Cerny (1997, p. 270), “state actors and different agencies are increasingly intertwined
with ‘transgovernmental networks’ – systemic linkages between state actors and agencies overseeing particular jurisdictions
and sectors, but cutting across different countries and including a heterogeneous collection of private actors and groups in
interlocking policy communities”.
4 CHRISTIANSEN Thomas, JØRGENSEN Knud Erik, WIENER Antje (Eds.) (2001), The Social Construction of Europe,
London, Sage.
5 Susan Strange defines power as « the ability of a person or a group of persons so to affect outcomes that their preferences
take precedence over the preferences of others » (1996, p. 17). She distinguishes structural and relational power. Relational
power is the power of A to get B to do something they would not otherwise do (1996, p. 24). Structural power “confers the
power to decide how things shall be done, the power to shape frameworks within which states relate to each other, relate to
people, or relate to corporate enterprises”. Structural power is to be found not in a single structure but in four separate
distinguishable but related structures”. It is control over security, production, finance and knowledge. (1996, p. 24-25)4
and legitimacy particularly takes place between the different actors involved in assistance to
CEEC.
Hypothesis:
1) We will argue that the Eastern enlargement is not a regime, nor a real foreign policy, but a
sui generis process: EU member state’s policies are not disappearing, but restructuring
within European sector-oriented networks.
2) We will claim that this restructuring process entails “internal” as well as “external”
logics, which are mutually constitutive, but have to be presented as such for analytical
purposes.
a) Changes within the federal state:
- The federal level (Bund) delegates the implementation to various actors of development
policy, particularly to half-public and (often economic) non-state actors. The questions to be
researched are following: What prompts the federal level to delegate the implementation of
policies to quasi-autonomous state agencies and other corporate or non-governmental actors?
Are there coordination processes?
- The federal level (Bund) and the regions (Länder) try to redefine their respective
competences on questions of foreign cooperation: do we observe or not a reinforcement of the
German “cooperative federalism”?
b) Changes in regard to the European level:
- We will argue that changes and adaptation processes are more likely to happen when there is
a goodness of fit between national and European norms. It will be analysed if tensions
between European and national actors are more likely to arise when relevant actors are
embedded in competing institutions, which differ in their view about what constitutes
“appropriate” behaviour
6?
- German federal and regional actors developed strategies in order to integrate the EU
institutional networks of assistance, defend their positions on specific questions, and keep
bilateral confident relations developed through national bilateral projects. What coordination
and institutionalisation processes are taking place at the EU and in the CEEC? What role do
bilateral relations play in this framework?
6 E. Thielemann (1999) tests this hypothesis in an article on EC state-aid. For him, “decisions from Brussels are likely to be
resisted when the institutional logic of a particular EU policy clashes with key institutionally entrenched domestic traditions”
(p. 402-3).5
In a first more conceptual part, an effort will be made to understand the nature of the “EU
Eastern enlargement” on an analytical point of view in order to study more precisely what is
assistance to CEEC. Is enlargement a new regime or a foreign policy? Then, we intend to find
a way to make the analytical link between both of the levels, the EU and the national ones.
The second more empirical part will present Germany’s policy to CEEC. The selected case
studies will then try to show how German actors, whose actions are embedded into a national
context and specific traditions, did adapt to European programs like Phare/Twinning and
ISPA. What are the strategies developed in this framework? May integration within European
networks be explained through the goodness of fit between European and national norms?
How do the federal level (the Bund) and the regions (the Länder) coordinate their policies
within European programs, and what are the consequences for German “cooperative
federalism”?
I – Defining the analytical framework
In his influential work “The Structure of Scientific Revolutions”, Thomas Kuhn argued that
theory construction is a paradigm-directed activity, and that it involves clarifying the concepts
presented in the dominant paradigm, and employing them in the light of research to elaborate
theories. The leading questions of this conceptual part will be following: After defining the
nature of EU Eastern enlargement and foreign assistance, how can we make the link between
national and EU foreign aid policies?
A – Questioning the nature of the EU Eastern enlargement
The EU Eastern enlargement entails two main interdependent phases: political negotiations,
and preparation for accession. In this paper, we will focus on the second, more dynamic one,
as it shows how integration processes are taking place within various sectors between Western
and Eastern partners parallel to political negotiations.
1) A new enlargement strategy
The way a European policy towards CEEC emerged is now well known. On the Arch summit
in Paris at the end of 1989, the G24 decided to entrust the European Commission with the6
coordination of the assistance to democracy and integration in market economy. The main
European assistance instruments – the programs PHARE for CEEC and TACIS for Newly
Independent States (NIS) – then first took shape. Bilateral trade agreements and later
association agreements were signed between the EU and every Eastern European state. In
1993, political and economic conditions were defined at the EU summit of Copenhagen
7:t h e
first negotiations for adhesion opened in March 1998 with 6 countries and, one year later,
with officially ten candidate states. A planification of EU financial and assistance measures
for the years 2000-2006 was signed at the EU Berlin summit in April 1999 (Annex 2),
opening ways to a stronger integration process, especially on the agricultural (SAPARD
program) and environmental / structural questions (ISPA program), but also on institution-
building projects (Twinning program). As a consequence, many authors analyse the EU
enlargement as a way to expend markets, as most of the agreements with CEEC and as a
consequence, the assistance programs, deal with the restructuring of trade and economics
in CEEC
8. Like A. Mayhew, ex-coordinator of the Phare program writes, between 1990 and
1996, only 1% of the EU assistance was dedicated to projects on “civil society” and
democratisation in CEEC, the rest concentrated on economic restructuring and market
economy
9.
Nevertheless, the existence of the Copenhagen criteria, and particularly of a supra-national
legal framework (the acquis communautaire) that the candidate states have to apply, suggests
to consider the enlargement as the source of an e wr e g i m e . Regimes are traditionally defined
as “sets of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures
around which actors’ expectations converge in a given area of international relations”
(Krasner, 1983, p. 2). But constructivist authors have rightly pointed out that the EU’s
institutional features and dynamics represents more than what the neo-liberal A. Moravcsik
(1993) simply calls a “successful intergovernmental regime”. Like K. Smith suggests, the
7 Accession conditions were defined at Copenhagen in 1993 as following: 1) stable institutions (democracy, rule of law,
human right, minority rights) ; 2) functioning market economy and capacity to cope with competitive pressures inside the
EC ; 3) ability to adopt the acquis; accepted the aims of political, economic, and monetary Union. (EU Commission, Agenda
2000).
8 See for example : Durand M. F., de Vasconcelos A. (dir.), La PESC, ouvrir l’Europe au monde, Paris, Presses de Sciences
Po, 1998. « Economic action stays the fondamental, quasi exclusive dimension of the European Union’s foreign policy, even
after Amsterdam », p. 43.
9 MAYHEW Alan, Recreating Europe : The European Union’s Policy towards Central and Eastern Europe,C a m b r i d g e ,
Cambridge University Press, 1998, p. 141.7
introducing of the Copenhagen criteria for the Eastern enlargement add a symbolic and
historic dimension that we do not find in any other policy of the EU
10.
Many scholars in fact agree on saying that the Eastern enlargement is not a policy like the
others. For H. Grabbe (2000), the creation of formal accession conditions has given the EU
institutions much wider leverage to get these applicants to comply with its demands than
previous ones. In this sense, “the pressures on CEE for adaptation and policy convergence
are considerably greater than those on previous applicants owing to the Union’s much more
advanced state of policy development – because of the completion of the single market in
1992, the integration of the Schengen area of passport-free movement into the EU’s treaty
framework in 1997, and the launch of the single currency in 1999”. As H. Grabbe points out,
the definition of accession criteria, and above all the obligation for candidates to apply the
whole acquis communautaire, creates a situation of desequilibrium, where EU institutions
have the power to influence CEE institutions on the long run (2002, p. 4-5).
For this reason, some authors consider the EU enlargement as a particular type of foreign
policy. Drawing on works of Roy Ginsberg (1989), H. Sjursen and E. Smith (2001) explain
that the process of “externalisation” is determinant, as it generated a foreign policy option that
could be executed in response to outside pressure from candidate states. As Å. Lundgren
(2002) agrees with them: those outside are, admittedly, members-to-become, or at least
potential members, but nevertheless not yet members. But, as L. Friis and A. Murphy (1999)
point out, the current process is also influencing the internal development of the EU,a n d
affecting decision-making of the EU and the member-states. Although these authors agree on
the fact that domestic and international spheres have become increasingly intertwined, their
analysis does not focus on the precise interface between both of them. Furthermore, the role
played by actors from candidate states are often forgotten in this process: Empirical findings
and interviews show that CEE actors integrated the experience of negotiations and
implementation of the assistance projects in an astonishing fast period, they also learned to
develop more self-confident strategies. So enlargement is not a one-way process led by the
West over the East. Because it is an interactive phenomena, it holds some consequences on
the way negotiations and assistance projects are lead and (re)defined.
10 K. Smith, PhD, 1995, cité par H. Sjursen, “Enlargement and the Common Foreign and Security Policy: Transforming the
EU’s External Policy?”, ARENA Working Papers, WP 98/18, University of Oslo, p. 68
Therefore, we will consider the EU enlargement is a sui generis process: As assistance policy
constantly has to integrate previous experiences for the definition of new tasks, it may be
asked if it also affects the distribution of competencies between European and national
actors
11, and the way policy-making and the implementation of aid within the enlargement
process looks like.
2 - Foreign assistance to CEEC: a mix of European and national experiences
For U. Sedelmeier and H. Wallace, “the activism and leadership provided by the Commission
were crucial elements in establishing that the EU would play a central role in promoting
systemic transformation in the CEECs and in coordinating Western policy more generally”
12.
In this article, we want to focus on the other actors and policies developed in this framework.
The specificity of the assistance to CEEC
Assistance, or aid, entails different kind of activities, categorized as humanitarian and
technical assistance activities. In the case of CEE, projects only focused up to 1992-93 on the
second one. The OCDE defines technical co-operation as 1) subventions for education and
training activities taking place in the donor or receiver country 2) financing of consultants,
audits and similar persons, as well as teachers and administrators sent abroad
13, often for the
purpose of institution-building projects. At the end of bipolarity, the Comity for Aid
Development (CAD) of the OECD created a new classification in order to distinguish
between aid for development countries (Africa, Asia, Latin America) - or official
development aid (ODA) -, and assistance to Central and Eastern European countries and New
Independent States (NIS), called Official Aid (OA).
It is interesting to notice that this classification has been retaken by most international
organisations and national policies, but in a different range. The EU distinguishes between
the CEEC (Baltic states included), the NIS and East-Southern Europe (Balkan). Each defined
“region” has its own aid program: PHARE for the CEEC, TACIS for the NIS and the pact of
stability for the Balkans. Parallel to these multilateral measures, the member of the G7, as
11 In her analysis of the EU program Phare, Florence Deloche (1998) for example showed that EU assistance policy relied on
the experience and resources of development aid in order to implement the Phare program.
12 SEDELMEIER Ulrich, WALLACE Helen, « Eastern enlargement: Strategy or Second Thoughts ?”, in: WALLACE
William, WALLACE Helen (2000), Policy-Making in the European Union,( 4
th ed.), Oxford, Oxford University Press, p.
433.
13 OCDE / CAD, Série des examens en matière de coopération pour le développement. Allemagne, (29), Paris, OCDE, 1998,
p. 85.9
well as most EU member-states, developed their own assistance program with different
priority regions: Northern EU countries (Finland, Sweden, Denmark, even UK) concentrate
on the Nordic cooperation of the EU (Poland, Baltic states, St Petersburg), Italy on Hungary
and the Balkans, France on Poland, Rumania and Russia, etc…
The German government, as we will see later in more details, distinguishes between the
“Transform countries”, i.e. “strategic countries” like Russia, Bielorussia, Ukraine, Poland,
Hungary, Czech Republic, Slovak Republic, Slovenia and the three Baltic states who get a
special attention from the federal level
14, and countries with an economy similar to
development ones, like Bulgaria, Romania, Croatia, etc
15…
The consequence of these multiple area definitions is following: The EU has been given the
difficult task to coordinate national and international programs which do not have the
same definition of priority regions, and priority sectors. Concerning the sector, most of the
projects focus on the restructuring of economies, some donor countries put the accent more on
culture, others on the promotion of small and medium companies (SME), or of human rights,
environmental norms and transfer of technologies, etc…
In studying the interface between national and European policies, we would like to answer
part of following question: how far do the priorities defined by the various actors of donor
countries on a very national or bilateral basis help integrate and enforce their position
within European assistance networks? What are the mechanisms of this integration
process, and to what extend does it modify the nature of national external policies?
Identifying tools for analysis: foreign policy analysis and networks
As foreign aid or foreign assistance is traditionally defined as a type of foreign policy, or a
policy dealing with the regulation of external relations, are the tools for the analysis of foreign
policy useful in the case of the assistance to CEEC?
The term “foreign policy” has been described as “the attempt of a state to influence its
international environment in order to create good conditions for the realisation of its own
interests” (Lübkemeier, 1998, pp.ii). For D. Clinton, the central problem in defining “national
interest” is how to distinguish between interests of the political community as a whole and
more particularist interests of specific groups within it
16. In the context of international
14 Transform program, aid for democracy and the developing of social market economy, coordinated by the Federal Ministry
of Economy, BMWi, and the Federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs, AA.
15 Coordinated by the Federal Ministry of Economic Development, BMZ.
16 On this point, see Hudson and Vore, 1995, p. 210 : ‘the national interest’ is more productively viewed as the interests of
various players – not all of which are coherently related to anything resembling an objective national interest’10
society, “it includes the ability both to protect the society from outside threats and to engage
in mutually beneficial cooperation with other societies” (D. Clinton, 1991, p. 50). Like Hyde-
Price (2000, p. 10) notices, these definitions indicate that foreign policy cannot be understood
by rationalist approaches that make a priori assumptions about interests as objectively
determined and pre-given. Instead, they suggest that a state’s behaviour can only be
understood with an analytical framework that includes a study of two essential factors: First,
through the cognitive frameworks and normative assumptions of policy-makers. Foreign
policy is “socially constructed” within a specific set of discourses and discursive practices.
These reflect the normative and historical context within which policy-makers operate.
Second, whilst normative and ideational factors can help understand the broad strategic
direction of a country’s foreign and security policy, they cannot shed much light on specific
policy decisions. For this reason, foreign and security policy analysis must consider the
institutional context within which decisions are framed and implemented. This includes
investigating “not just the cocktail of ministries and government agencies that constitute the
‘complex institutional ensemble’ that is the modern state, but also the influence of non-
governmental actors” (A. Favell).
We want to stress the difference between decision and implementation processes. In the case
studies presented further, an emphasis will not only be put on what has been agreed at the
political level, but especially on what is implemented at the administrative one.
As we mainly focus on policy implementation, the tools proposed by the literature on
networks and policy-networks will also be taken into account
17. Although these tools are
those used for the analysis of national policies, we will take into account how they can be
integrated into a more complex framework including a supra-national level.
B - Consequences for analysing the implementation of the assistance to CEEC
The new institutionalist agenda and literature on sociology of elites will help analysing
interaction processes between different assistance policies to CEEC.
17 On networks, see M. Castells (1996), on policy-networks, see for example in French Le Gales Patrick, Thatcher Mark
(Dir.) (1995), and in English or German B. Kohler-Koch and Tanja Börzel.11
1) The new institutionalist agenda
In the debate on the nature of the EU
18, one approach has particularly contributed to the study
of the socially textured nature of European order, namely ‘new institutionalism’
19.I th a sl e d
to greater awareness of the effect of social and political structures on political behaviour and
decision-making (March and Olson, 1989). It has also served to increase cross-fertilisation
between domestic, comparative and international politics (Milner, 1998, p. 760), and gave
birth to a large literature on (multi-level) governance and Europeanisation. Before asking if
the tools proposed by these two perspectives are useful for our research, we have to define
what are institutions.
Define institutions: three kind of intitutionalism
Like E.R. Thielemann (1999, p. 401) notices, the new institutionalist research agenda is
characterized by a high degree of ambiguity, including lack of agreement over what to
consider as an institution. He proposes to adopt Norgaard’s definition, which encompasses
both formal institutions (decision-making rules) and informal ones (habitual action).
Institutions can therefore be defined as “legal arrangements, routines, procedures,
conventions, norms and organizational forms that shape and inform human interaction”
(1996, p. 39)
20.
Different disciplines – like sociology, comparative politics, international relations, European
questions, FPA, political economy – nowadays adopted new institutionalism. P. Hall and R.
Taylor proposed in 1996 to classify the prolific works into three categories, namely
rationalist, historical and sociological institutionalism. For rational institutionalists, actors
seek to maximize the attainment of goals and base their decisions upon strategic and rational
calculations. D. North (1990) for example regards institutions as incentive structures which
influence an individual’s utility-maximizing behaviour, but it is assumed that actors’
preference formation is external to the institutional context in which actors find themselves.
Most rationalist writers (Scharpf, 1988; Pollack, 1996) pursue an actor-centred analysis.
Supranational institutions, like the Commission, are understood to act in the multi-level
18 For a summary of the debate and a position against realism and neo-liberalism, see Lequesne C., Smith A. (1997).
19 Hyde-Price A. (2000)
20 Oran Young distinguishes between institutions and organisations. He defines institutions as “sets of rules of the game or
codes of conduct that serve to define social practices, assign roles to the participants in these practices, and guide the
interactions among occupants of these roles”. Organisations, on the other hand, are “material entities possessing offices,
personnel, budgets, equipment, and, more often than not, legal personality. Put another way, organisations are actors in
social practices. Institutions affect the behaviour of these actors by defining social practices and spelling out codes of
conduct appropriate to them, but they are not actors in their own right” (Young, 1994, pp; 3-4).12
environment of European policy-making. In contrast, more historical or sociological
institutionalist accounts perceive of institutions as the context that constitutes national and
supranational actors by shaping their interests and identities (March and Olsen, 1989; Powell
and DiMaggio, 1991). S. Steinmo for example emphasizes that rationality is embedded in a
context: “In politics, political institutions provide the basic context in which groups make
their strategic choices. And any rational actor will behave differently in different institutional
contexts” (1993, p. 7). As historical institutionalists are interested in the relationship between
politics and economics, and in the way resources and power is distributed among actors,
sociological-oriented approaches raise the question as to what extent an actor’s broader
institutional context – defined by the legal and political-administrative traditions of a political
system or policy area in which actors are embedded – can lead to rule-governed behaviour
that may supplant instrumental calculations. In other words, sociological approaches ask
questions about how traditions and rule structures shape expectations about what is
considered “appropriate” behaviour and influence policy outcomes. For E. Thielemann
(1999), sociological institutionalism complements other approaches by making the following
principal propositions:
(i) Institutions provide actors with a particular understanding of their interests
regarding a particular policy issue. Therefore, a calculus of identity and
appropriateness is sometimes more important to actors than a calculus of political
costs and benefits (March and Olsen, 1989)
(ii) Institutions are not neutral structures as they privilege certain types of policy and
certain actors over others (Hall and Taylor, 1996; Armstrong and Bulmer, 1997).
By giving legitimacy to some groups, while denying it to others, institutions affect
not only the structure of the decision-making process, they also influence what
interests are reflected in policy outcomes (Immergut, 1997, p. 340). Nevertheless,
given the circumstances, actors have choices and can change institutional
structures (E. Thielemann, 1999, p. 402).
For some authors, it could also be possible to add ideational or cognitive institutionalism. We
prefer staying closer to historical and especially sociological institutionalism, which allows
making the bridge between different disciplines and approaches, and especially with social
constructivism.13
Europeanisation, a key concept?
After the failure of federalist and neo-functionalist theories to conceptualise regional
integration
21, new institutionalism particularly inspired new research agendas in the 1990s,
opening ways to a large and flourishing literature on governance and Europeanisation.I n
this article, we will present our comments on the second approach, where the literature is
quite heteroclite: Projects for example focus on the way national actors represent their
interests at the European level, or on the impact of European norms on national institutions of
either EU-member states or candidate countries. For Radaelli (2000), Europeanisation has to
be differentiated from other concepts like convergence, harmonization and integration. Taking
the definition of Ladrech (1994), Europeanisation might be defined “as a set of processes
through which the EU political, social and economic dynamics become part of the logic of
domestic discourse, identities, political structures and public policies”. In contrast to the first
writings on Europeanisation that concentrated only on the EU impact on domestic political
structures (institutions, public administration, legal structure), this definition has the
advantage to include other fields of research, like structures of representation, cognitive and
normative structures and public policy, helping to bridge the rationalist-constructivist divide
(J. Checkel)
22. Although a large literature is now developing on the impact of the EU eastern
enlargement process on CEEC domestic institutions, there is no consistent reflection on
Europeanisation of foreign policy so far, i. e. on the impact of EU norms and institutions on
bilateral co-operation networks. Fewer are the writings on the impact of the EU enlargement
agenda on EU member states’ policies and on their bilateral relations to CEEC.
In fact, the full picture of this particular and unique enlargement process may not be
catched if one does not understand mutual adjustments taking place between member and
candidate states. Within the enlargement process, a great competition takes place on the fields
of norms, values and institutional procedures, mostly in order to influence CEEC actors and
structures. As Radaelli (2000) notices, while quoting Jachtenfuchs (1999), « the analysis of
21 The analysis of institutional and normative restructuring processes in the EU is again a prolific research agenda. For a good
synthesis on European integration and regionalization processes, see Elmar Rieger (1995) and Ruth Zimmeling (1991), but
also Joenniemi Pertti (1997), Caporaso (1996), Waever (1996), Zürn (1996).
22 CHECKEL Jeffrey T., “International Norms and Domestic Politics. Bridging the Rationalist-Constructivist Divide”,
European Journal of International Relations, 3 (12), 1997, pp.473-495. See also M. Zürn, T. Risse, or Jachtenfuchs, Kohler-
Koch, R. Mayntz. On the interdisciplinary approach of European studies, see the debate between Simon Hix (defending a
rationalist, public policy perspective) and Andrew Hurrell and Anand Menon (defending that comparative politics and
international relations are complementary) in West European Politics (Jan. 1994, April 1996) and the Journal of European
Public Policy (1998).14
cognitive and normative structure is connected to the renewed interest in sociological
institutionalism, preference formation and political legitimacy ».
Although very attractive, it may be noticed that the protean and multi-faceted form of the
concept of Europeanisation does not especially make the analysis of Europe’s construction
easier, as scholars do not agree on the definition of territorial spaces, interaction or causal
links. Furthermore, it does not explain how power is redistributing at the European context
23.
For this reason, we will draw on part of this literature, but want to avoid the term of
‘Europeanisation’ in our analysis.
As our question consists in understanding the interactions between European actors and
national ones, it is necessary to come back to a more classic question, namely the structure-
agency relationship.
2) A sociological institutionalist perspective
In a historical institutionalist perspective, one of the main questions consists in understanding
how power is distributed among actors. On a more sociological point of view, we would like
to analyse who are the norms entrepreneurs in the framework of the EU enlargement in order
to understand how governmental actors interact with non-governmental ones: How do they
decide, along which criteria (rationalist or identity ones)?
a) Coming back to a key question: the structure-agency relation and the distribution of
power
This question was developed in the early 1980s by new institutionalists (DiMaggio, March
and Olson), and has recently been integrated by scholars of international political economy
and foreign policy analysis. In an article entitled “The Agency-Structure Problem in Foreign
Policy Analysis” (1992), Carlsnaes indicates the importance of studying the relative weight of
agential and structural factors in different concrete instances of foreign policy behaviour. He
emphasises the interaction over time between structure and agency, which allows this process
to be “penetrated analytically as a consequence of its essentially sequential thrust in societal
transformation”
24: This process of mutual constitution means that neither structure nor
23 For a critical approach of Europeanisation, see Papadimitriou D. G. (2002);
24 “In this perspective, actions thus not only are casually affected by structures, but in turn – in terms of both intended and
unintended outcomes – subsequently affect them, and so forth, indicating the mutually dynamic relationship between the two15
agency can be accorded ontological priority (McSweeney, 1999). As Colin Hay has argued
(1995, p. 205), this implies two avenues of investigation. The first is the “contextualisation of
agency”. This involves contextualising foreign policy behaviour within the structural context
in which it takes place, and considering how developments in the wider Europe impact upon
the context and strategies, intentions and actions, of the actors involved in EU member’s
foreign policy. The second is the “strategic selectivity of structure”. EU governments are
situated within institutions, normative and material structures that define the range of potential
strategies and opportunities available to it. These structures can constrain EU actors’ freedom
of manoeuvre, but can provide resources for enabling action and amplifying its influence on
European affairs (Hoffman, 1995, p. 282). For A. Hyde Price (2000, p. 14), it may be agreed
that shifts in normative understanding are often manifested in changed identity and national
role conceptions, which in turn will precipitate change in foreign policy. Therefore, one
analytical consequence of the agency-structure problematic is its implications for the concept
of power. Colin Hay has argued (1995, p. 191) that power “is fundamentally bound up with
the idea of the victory of the agent or subject over its other – structure or object. Power is a
question of agency, of influencing or ‘having an effect’ upon the structures, which set contexts
and define the range of possibilities of others. This suggests the need for a relational
conception of both the structure and agency: one person’s agency is another person’s
structure. Attributing agency is therefore attributing power (both causal and actual)”. Power
derives from both tangible and intangible resources (Stoessinger, 1991), and can be both
relational and structural (Strange, 1988). Drawing on S. Strange typology, Hyde-Price writes
that it manifests itself in four dimensions: political, economic, normative and military. In the
case of the EU enlargement, the last one stays apart from the other, so that we only take the
first three into account.
Finally, the relationship between EU members as agents and Europe as structure can best be
understood as being mutually constitutive
25.T h i sp e r s p e c t i v eo w e sm u c ht os o c i a l
constructivist arguments that highlight “the construction of social structures by agents as well
as the way in which those structures, in turn, influence and reconstruct agency” (Finnemore,
1996, p. 24). At the same time, states themselves are involved in a process of “strategic
over time as well as the inherently constraining and enabling character of the structural domain. In other words, to explain
fully a policy action at a certain point in time, this conceptualisation indicates the necessity of considering not only its
underlying casual structures, but also previous actions and both the structural effects and structural antecedents of the latter
(Carlsnaes, 1994, pp. 284-85).
25 A. Hyde-Price (2000)16
learning” – or what Bill McSweeney calls “seduction” (1999, pp. 196-70) – which may result
in changed conceptions of the structure and the state itself.
b) Understanding the restructuring state: Sociology of the German assistance’s milieu
In order to bridge European questions and foreign policies, we will rely on historical and
sociological new institutionalism. As the nature of enlargement is particular, we will also
adopt part of the literature on sociology of European elites in order to analyse the actors
involved into foreign aid programs and projects, may they be called “advocacy coalitions”
(Sabatier) or “epistemic communities” (P. Haas). It is only after having understood the way it
works, that we will be able to get some conclusions on the way the state is restructuring
within the European construction.
•  Sociology of elites
In the discipline of sociology, the growing literature on sociology of European elites tries to
catch the logics underpinning the making of a supra-national elite. Maurizio Bach´s thesis of
“Bürokratisierung” of Europe, i.e. of a Europe more and more led by technocrats, is
particularly interesting in our case
26. He quotes F. Fischer (1990) for explaining that
“technocracy, in classical terms, refers to a system of governance in which technically
trained experts rule by virtue of their specialised knowledge and position in dominant
political and economic institutions”
27. He takes the works of R. Lepsius as a point of
departure in order to question legitimisation processes within the EU (the right of legislative
initiative and the administrative implementation are both controlled by the Commission), and
to show that, although national experiences still represent the references for the building of
European institutions, a new “transnational type of regime” led by technocrates and experts, a
European structure sui generis characterised by a strong juridicisation process, is taking
shape.
We will adopt a similar position, and will try to show that the Commission is not a unitary
actor. General directions, and the numerous comities working for them, are often in
competition, and integration processes between national and European actors in fact take
place within specific sectors, or around precise topics.
26 Bach Maurizio (1999), Die Bürokratisierung Europas: Verwaltunseliten, Experten und politische Legitimation in Europa,
Frankfurt/Main, New-York, Campus Verlag.
27 F. Fischer, 1990, p. 17.17
•  New institutionalist variables of analysis
Authors of different disciplines, like P. Hall, A. Hyde-Price, V. Rittberger and M. Bach, all
identify three variables that need to be investigated in a new institutionalist point of view:
interests, institutions and identity. As we consider in a constructivist perspective (or
sociological institutionalist one) that identity and interests are mutually constitutive, only two
criteria in fact need to be analysed:
- Identity, ideas and beliefs: ideas may be defined in a three-fold categorisation (Goldstein,
Keohane, 1993): ‘World views’ are imbedded in the symbolism of culture and entwined with
identity-conceptions; ‘Principled beliefs’ are normative ideas for distinguishing between right
or wrong; ‘causal beliefs’ are beliefs about cause-effect relationships which provide guides as
to how to achieve a given policy objective. Ideas and beliefs may serve as ‘road maps’,
guiding actors’ preferences and indicating ways of achieving them; they can act as a ‘focal
point’ for actors in the absence of compromise or cooperation; they can become
‘institutionalised’, i.e. embedded in the operation of institutions and social practices. (Hyde-
Price, 2000)
- Institutions: Institutions play a key role in the process of identity and interest formation.
(…) Institutions ‘offer a normative context that constitutes actors and provide a set of norms
in which the reputation of actors acquires meaning and value (Katzenstein, 1997, pp. 12-13).
International institutions and multilateral structures thus facilitate the emergence of a sense of
Gemeinschaft (community) based on shared interests, trust and a common identity. (Hyde-
Price, 2000)
J. Goldstein and R. Keohane (1993) explain that through the intervention of institutions
“the impact of ideas may be prolonged for decades or even generations… [such that they]
can have an influence even when no one genuinely believes in them as principled or causal
statements”. It is also essential to refer to social learning as defined by J. Nye (1987) and P.
Haas (1993) in order to link these three variables: “New understanding of the social and
political environment can prompt decision makers to alter their strategies for achieving
goals, the latter remaining basically unchanged. Alternatively, new understandings can
redefine the very content of the national interest, requiring the selection of new goals and a18
search for more appropriate strategies to achieve them”
28. In this perspective, it may be
asked if socialization processes and “specific bilateral relations” help “fostering European
integration on a longer prospect”
29 and thus “rearrange the relation between society and
state”
30 in the European public space.
•  Methodology
We define following target group: politico-administrative and non-governmental elites
working with the Bund and the Länder. We already did around 60 interviews in Germany at
various ministries, state agencies and non-governmental organisations, but also at the German
representations and local ministries and organisations in Estonia, Poland, Czech Republic,
Hungary and Slovenia.
The main focus is on governmental aid, or official aid, not a priori on private initiatives
although both of them often intersect. The institutions we will therefore take into
consideration are legal norms, like the acquis communautaire in specific sectors, but also
general topics defined for implementing the assistance on the transfer of norms, and ways of
doing or working-traditions.
The leading questions we need to answer are therefore following: Who are the key actors?
What are the institutional dimensions of enlargement in the analysed case? How do the actors
integrate them? Do they really influence their strategies? How do the actors take the different
levels of action (Bund, Länder, EU, CEEC) into account? How far does their direct
institutional environment (organisation they work for, federal and state traditions) influence
their decisions and strategies?
Institutions (norms, rules, etc…) and the evolving actor’s identities have partly already been -
but still need to be - identified and analysed through interviews, official documents and
reports, newspaper articles, debates at the parliament (Bundestag), etc… We are still working
on a more precise way to make the link between the various empirical findings.
28 Hasenclever, Mayer, Rittberger (1996), p. 208. Boekle, Rittberger and Wagner (1999) also distinguish between societal
and transnational socialization processes.
29 BEDOW Wilfried (von), “Bilateral Beziehungen im Netzwerk regionaler und globaler Interdependenz”, in: KAISER Karl,
KRAUSE Joachim (Hrsg.), Deutschlands neue Außenpolitik, Interessen und Strategien, Band III, DGAP, München,
Oldenburg, 1996.
30 ALBERT Mathias, “Between ‘South of Norden’ and ‘Norden’s South’: Germany and a ‘Baltic political space’”, in:
JOENNIEMI Pertti (Ed.), op.cit.,p .8 5 .19
II – German assistance to CEEC in the enlarging European Union: which future for the
federal state?
For A. Hyde-Price (2000, p. 12), the study of German foreign policy in relation to the
reshaping of European order raises questions concerning Germany’s ability to influence its
external environment: to what extend is Germany the object rather than the subject of change
in post-cold war Europe? For the author, the Federal Republic is embedded in a series of
multilateral structures that both constrain its range of foreign policy actions, and empower it
to act in certain ways. We now want to test if this assumption is also true in the case of the
assistance to CEEC.
2) The Bund facing the Länder: towards a new definition of cooperative federalism?
Normative and institutional roots of the federal strategy: the Transform program at its
roots
The German program Transform is one of the most important governmental responses to
these questions in Europe. Between 1990 and 2000, a total of 2.377 billion DM was spent for
consulting activities as well as other matters, mostly under the label of the program
Transform. It mainly consists in education and training of selected partners from 11 countries,
which, according to criteria determined by the OECD, are involved in a transformation
process
31. Between 1993 and 2000, more than 1500 projects were implemented through
Transform in manifold sectors – economics, politics, agriculture, law, environment, and social
matters. In this framework, German ministries strengthened their links to non-governmental
organisations and companies
32, and especially relied on networks developed during forty
years of development policy abroad and on the experience of reunification.
The German government adopted an extensive definition of security
33. In an unpublished
decision of 1992, the Federal Cabinet identifies three factors of threat and destabilisation in
CEEC and Newly Independent States (NIS):
31 They include Belarus, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, Russia,
Ukraine, and since 1998, Slovenia.
32 In its Journalistenhandbuch, the BMZ explains it had to develop stronger co-operation with civil society, like through
Public-Private Partnerships (PPP), in order to cope with nowadays global evolutions. BMZ (2000).
33 In this sense, the implemented strategy draws on J. Nye’s idea of soft power. NYE Joseph S., “ Redefining the National
Interest ”, Foreign Affairs, 78 (4), juil.-août 1999, pp. 22-35. On security, see : BIGO Didier, “ Sécurité et immigration ”,
Cultures et Conflits, (31-32), aut-hiv. 1998, p. 7-11.20
1) Political destabilization (disorganization of the state, risks of civil war, weak belief in
democracy);
2) Collapse of society (strong immigration, especially of the elite having knowledge on
weapon and missiles production, but also on nuclear and sanitary questions);
3) Collapse of economics (recession of production and trade, growing inflation and
unemployment)
34.
The main idea of the program is the same as in assistance for third-world countries: “help the
countries to help themselves” (Hilfe zur Selbsthilfe) in their transformation
35. It also aims to
present three norms constituting German post-war identity
36:
1) “The model of social market economy characterized first by its open, competitive
economy and second by its social security system; (model of social economy)
2) The experience of reconstruction [after WW II] and of reunification; (democratisation
process)
3) The strengths of a federalist [and pluralist] state structure” (federalism)
37.
These norms justify the implementation of Transform’s consulting activities in following
issues
38:
- Back up economic policies in order to create the conditions for a social market economy and to establish
medium-size companies and other relevant economic structures;
- The restructuring of companies, privatisation and breaking up monopolies;
- The setting up of a fiscal system to include taxes, customs and excises and budgets; establishing the
banking, stock market and insurance systems;
- Technical assistance to the agricultural sector;
34 KABINETTBESCHLUSS vom 18. März 1992. “ Gesamtkonzept zur Beratung beim Aufbau von Demokratie und sozialer
Marktwirtschaft in den Staaten Mittel-und Osteuropas sowie der GUS ”. (not published)
35 The underlying notions are subsidiarity and solidarity. „Help for selfhelp“ was the leading concept of the American
Marshall plan in Europe. The idea has been included in the German development policy, as most of the institutions and
organisations created for the implementation of the Marshall plan in Germany then became the leading actors of Germany’s
aid for third world or development countries.
36 BMZ, BMZ aktuell, TRANSFORM, Beratung für Mittel- und Osteuropa, Fortschreibung 1999, Nr. 104, Bonn, BMZ,
August 1999, p. 13.
37 It may be noticed that a research project of the European Institute of Florence on the evolution of several EU states identity
in the European context also reveals the existence of the same societal norms in the German case: “Any new idea about
political order, in order to be considered legitimate, must resonate with core elements of older visions of the political order
such as ‘state-centred republicanism’ in France, ‘parliamentary democracy and external sovereignty’ in Great Britain, and
‘federalism, democracy and social market economy’ in Germany”. MARCUSSEN Martin, RISSE Thomas,
ENGELMANN-MARTIN Daniela, KNOPF Hans-Joachim, ROSCHER Klaus, „Constructing Europe? The Evolution of
French, British and German Nation State Identities“, Journal of European Public Policy, 6 (4), Special Issue, 1999, pp. 614-
633.
For a comparison, the norms promoted by the G-24 assistance were: “adherence to the rule of Law, respect of human rights,
adoption of a multi-party political system, holding of free and fair elections and adoption of a market-oriented economy”. G-
24, Ongoing International Co-operation with the Czech Republic, meeting and working-documents, 1995.21
- Job training and specialised training in business (i.e. management training, vocational training), as well as
measures leading to qualifications;
- The law, with an emphasis on economic law;
- Helping both to create and to improve administrative structures;
- Back-up advisory services in labour market policy and social policy, environmental protection, house
building and urban development
Although all sectors are linked together, the German program progressively focused on the
third source of destabilization identified in 1992, i.e. economics (46% of the expertise).T h e
other sectors, and especially the social and environmental ones, do only represent a marginal
part of the assistance – respectively 4 % and 2% in 1998 (Annex 3). As a matter of fact, the
government’s failure to contain immigration from CEEC and NIS between 1989 and 1994
allowed further assistance to develop co-ordination procedures on economics. Therefore
Transform’s activities mainly help backing up German companies and trade in targeted
countries, i.e. regions where the German economy had already developed before 1989. In this
context, the social market economy is not only a guide for action, but also a label used by
public actors in order to justify two majors aims: 1) make German private actors win
assistance contracts and influence structural and legal features as well as practices, 2) build
long lasting networks drawn on confidence through education and training, and change
Germany’s image abroad by publicising successful projects in local CEEC newspapers.
Priority for trade activities is also reflected in the regional distribution of the assistance:t h e
major part of the budget and most of the projects concern Russia, Bielorussia and Ukraine
(Annex 4). Some candidate states like Estonia, the Czech Republic, and Hungary do not
beneficiate any more from the German bilateral assistance “because of their good results”
and the growing place of EU programs
39. It is interesting to notice that Bulgaria was replaced
in 1998 by Slovenia, a country officially accepted in the first step of EU negotiations. It may
be asked if these changes speak for the defence of German national interests, or rather for
compliance to EU-decisions and multilateral co-operation perspectives for sharing the burden.
38 BMWi, TRANSFORM : Die Beratung Mittel- und Osteuropas beim Aufbau von Demokratie und sozialer Marktwirtschaft –
Konzept und Beratungsprogramme der Bundesregierung, (350), Bonn, BMWi - KfW, 1994. BMWi-Dokumentation.
39 Quoted from interviews at the Ministry of Economics (BMWi) and Ministry for Co-operation (BMZ), official co-
ordinators of the program, and from annual reports. Behind these official discourses are other reasons: in the Estonian case,
German assistance was not required, except on law and privatisation projects. In the Czech case, no governmental agreement
could be signed. Many people refer to the bad relations between H. Kohl and Václav Klaus, but also to the veto of Bavarian
economic and agricultural lobbies at the Bundestag.22
Interviews and official documents reveal a strong distortion between official discourses on
co-ordination and the ways projects are effectively co-ordinated. Apparently structured and
shaped by public actors, the German program is in fact mostly implemented by governmental
organizations and non-state actors. Only few new institutions emerged after 1989 in Germany
for the assistance to CEEC. The institutional networks are a mix of previous W. Brandt’s
Ostpolitik institutions based on trade, of development policy organizations and of new
structures created after 1989 for the German reunification processes or the assistance to CEEC
and NIS, and almost every German ministry and their main (public and private) partners are
represented. The mostly sector-oriented networks are made up of experts in federal, regional
and local administrations, in health care systems, in NGOs or companies’ foundations, in
chambers of commerce, and consulting-companies….
The German government adopted an integrated approach for the co-ordination of the
program: the different actors officially work together under the leading role of the
Lenkungsausschuß,atriumvirat composed by the ministry of Economics (BMWi), the
Foreign Office (AA), and the ministry for Co-operation and Development (BMZ). Until the
election of G. Schröder in 1998, former Secretary of State for Agriculture Dr. Walter Kittel (a
close friend of Helmut Kohl) was responsible for the general co-ordination
40. A whole
structure has been set for the representation of German sectors abroad: the German Bank for
Reconstruction (KfW), beneficiating of the main part of the programme’s budget, set up 11
local offices (KOST-Stellen) in the German embassies of Transform countries in order to
manage and co-ordinate the various projects. The KfW experts acquired a sort of monopoly
on transition matters, using links to economics as well as diplomatic contacts. On many
occasions, congresses and seminars were organised in CEEC with other German actors, like
political foundations, chambers of commerce (representation offices – AHK – opened in quite
all CEEC), trade representation of Länder (like Schleswig-Holstein in Estonia or Bavaria in
Hungary), etc…
However, the co-ordination reflects political rivalries and power relations between German
actors: for the ministries, the control of the Lenkungsauschuß and the dividing up of the
annual budget is at stake
41, whereas many state agencies and NGOs, who already
40 After the restructuring of the assistance by the Schröder government, W. Kittel was dismissed. He is now a personal
consultant of the Lithuanian government.
41 Elements of path dependency may be noticed on this case: the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (AA) has only a small influence
in the program. Rivalries rather take place between the Ministry of Economy (BMWi) and the Ministry of economic Co-23
communicate everyday, believe annual co-ordination meetings in Bonn (since 2001 in Berlin)
are a loss of time. Another contradiction lies in the implementation of the program. While
Eastern partners officially spontaneously ask for German assistance, the reality shows that
German companies or state agencies on the contrary, directly contacted most of Eastern
partners. These actors most of the time had already built contacts in CEEC in order to
evaluate (or even to create) the needs, and help their partners elaborate a project, to be
submitted to German governmental agencies, and then approved by German ministries.
Manifold critics opened ways in Germany to controlling procedures and reforms were also a
little debated at the Bundestag in 1994-95 and 1998-99
42. In this sense, one may not speak of
the instrumentalisation of NGOs or private actors by public actors, as there are processes of
mutual influence. The analysis of the societal organisations, agencies, private (companies’)
foundations, expert organisations or political foundations are in general followed up or partly
retaken by administrative organizations
43: in this sense, we may call them places of informal
diplomacy
44, although many of these particular activities are often classified under the term of
“business of aid” (J. Putzel, 1998).
Since a few years, projects are more and more driven through multilateral donors. Up to
1995, Transform’s annual budget strongly decreased (Annex 1): in 1997 it was comparable to
the UK’s one, and the budget for consulting activities on privatisation represented a sixth of
the American bilateral technical assistance on the same matter
45. Transform’s budget was also
put to the test by the re-orientation of the German assistance to South-Eastern European
countries: the German financing to reconstruction and democratisation in the Balkans was in
1999 as high as used to be the Transform budget in 1995, i. e. 300 million DM. Thus, the
governmental program was restructured: Many ministries lost the national budget for their
operation (BMZ), but also the Ministry of Finance (BMF), that receive the main part of the budget. It is interesting to notice
that these ministries and their related organisations (KfW…) were represented at the Ost-Ausschuss der deutschen Wirtschaft,
related to the Federation of German Industry (DIHT), the main actor of Willy Brandt’s Ostpolitik.
42 See debates during the 12. and the 14. election periods (Wahlperiode), particularly the evaluation presented in 1994 by the
Bundesrechnungshof (German federal Audit Office) at the Bundestag on the budget of the Ministry of Economy (BMWi):
Drucksache 12/8490, Deutscher Bundestag, 12. Wahlperiode, pp. 41-44. It revealed that many projects were driven without
respecting usual procedures of development policy, i.e. without inviting tenders, implemented by “unexperienced
organisations”. The Office reproaches the Ministry of Economy (BMWi) wanting to use the experience of reunification
“although new solutions have to be find for totally different existing problems in Central and Eastern Europe”. The Office
also claims for more control of the federal parliament on these governmental activities (p. 42). It is important to add that
controls are rare. Similar discussions also took place in 1993-1994 at the American Congress.
43 Nevertheless, it is not easy to judge what is exactly retaken or not, as some interviews revealed that some analyses are not
even read by administrators because of their length.
44 Some scholars wrote about “privatisation” of state’s policies (B. Hibou, 1997; T. Brühl, 2001). Béatrice Hibou for example
thinks that states adapt to domestic and international constraints by cooperating more and more with semi-public and private
actors. As a result of the ever increasing role of transnational actors in political decisions, public actions are more and more
focusing on economic matters and integrating economic and financial questions in their discourse.
45 GTZ, 1999, p.10.24
consulting activities, especially those badly represented at the national level or with low
legitimacy for driving foreign activities (social questions, environment, Ministry of Internal
questions…). Some co-ordination offices of the KfW (Koordinationsstellen - KOST) closed
(Tallinn, Budapest. Warsaw’s KOST will close at the end of 2002), and because many actors
had to adapt to EU tenders procedures, coalitions between different governmental agencies
took place in order to stay competitive at the European level (Phare, Tacis…).
The result of the changing context is that German actors of bilateral programs put more and
more European norms and values in the forehead:M o s to fTransform’s projects stopped
promoting social market economy and federalism, but German experience on how to deal
with European procedures (representation processes, ways on writing tenders, creation of
software for the classification of Phare tenders…), assistance on the introduction of the
European currency (Euro), education on European institutional history… The actors also had
to adapt to more bureaucratic and competitive procedures and to develop strategies of
representation and lobby within the European Commission in order to win tenders. Many civil
servants and experts complained that procedures thus became longer and less flexible than in
the national one, thus “had no other choice than to adapt to them”
46.
Reinforcing German cooperative federalism?
•  The Länder, new foreign policy actors
The federal structure of the assistance encourages overlapping actions
47:A sm a t t e ro ff a c t
German states (Länder) as well as cities (like Hamburg, Bremen, Munich), universities and
other public administrations have built their own networks of relations with CEEC
48.
Sometimes, solely individuals are the source of these connections between local, federal, and
even supra-national levels, as they work for the German Parliament, are part of a local NGO,
and/or have contacts at the European Commission. The personal address book of some
46 Interview at the IRZ-Stiftung and the Carl-Duisberg-Gesellschaft, Bonn / Köln, February 2000. Interview at the Federal
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, department for the EU-negociations and the co-ordination of European assistance projects,
Berlin, February 2001.
47 However, the moving of the German government to Berlin somehow contributed to the reshaping of this federal structure:
Bonn, where the BMZ and BMA stayed, and the Ruhr-region have turned into an institutionalised pool of expertise and
development assistance, whereas Berlin has become the centre of political decisions. A Centre for International Co-operation
(CIC) was created on the 1
st July 1998 in Bonn, and constitutes the rallying point of federal ministries (BMZ, BMU, BML),
about 150 NGOs and German representations of United Nations’ organisations.
48 “German foreign policy operates in a dual mode. The government’s traditional foreign policy is complemented by
Germany’s societal foreign policy (gesellschaftliche Aussenpolitik). Most of the major German institutions conduct their own
foreign relations”, in: Peter J. Katzenstein (1997a), p.24-25.25
(political, business…) influent people situated on the intersection of these networks may
prove more efficient than a whole organisation
49.
Like the Bund,t h eLänder can officially sign bilateral agreements with foreign governments
in the framework of their competencies (Article 23 and 24 Ia of the Basic Law). Since the
Länder have the right to participate to European decisions (1992: subsidiarity inscribed into
the Maastricht treaty, modification of the German Basic Law), most of them developed a
European policy, creating representation offices in Brussels, and especially interregional
relations with non-EU members states. Some Länder opened representation offices, or
Chambers of commerce, in CEEC, like Schleswig-Holstein and Mecklenburg-Vorpommern in
the Baltic States (Tallinn, Riga, Vilnius), or Bavaria and Baden-Würtemberg in Hungary.
Most of them also initiated bilateral working commissions, who generally have as aim to
develop and strengthen cultural and economic cooperation. It is interesting to notice the role
played by history and long-lasting boundaries for the renewed cooperation of the 1990s. A
partnership existing since the 1970s between Kiel and Tallinn for example served as a basis
for a project on creating an Estonian Chamber of commerce: The project was lead with the
help of advisors coming from organisations (SEQUA, SES) connected with the German
industry and trade federation (DIHT). Financing support first came from the German federal
(Transform program) and state budget (Schleswig-Holstein), and in a second phase from the
European Commission (Phare). But, most important, norms transferred were German sector
and organisational ones, and one of the expert now leads the German permanent
representation in Tallinn, which contributes to maintain bilateral and interregional contacts.
This is an example of the kind of interconnections commonly observed in assistance to CEEC
(and also to development countries) between state, federal, and EU levels, mostly through one
or several key-persons, because of their personal resources and contacts.
In general, political-administrative actors of the Länder try to make an extensive promotion of
their official competencies (culture, education, police, trade policies), and a large
interpretation of their new prerogatives in the Basic Law (art 23, participation to European
decisions, art 24 Ia, conclusion of transborder agreements on cooperation) for the extension of
their own international relations
50. Most representation offices of the Länder in Brussels or
49 For example M. Wittman, CDU member of the Bundestag, former president of the Bund der Vertriebene (BdV),i sa tt h e
same time personally involved in many societal reconstruction projects in CEEC.
50 FISCHER Thomas (2002), “Die Außenpolitik der deutschen Länder als Ausdruck ‚perforierter’ nationalstaatlicher
Souveränität? Transföderalismus zwischen Kooperation und Konkurrenz“, in: WHELING Hans-Georg (Hrsg.), Die
deutschen Länder. Geschichte, Politik, Wirtschaft, (2. Aufl.), Opladen, Leske + Budrich.26
abroad consider themselves as small embassies, defending the interests of state companies,
and organising cultural events for the promotion of the Land
51. But how far is the German
cooperative federalism put into question since the 1990s?
•  Bund and Länder, which coordination?
Like E. Thielemann (1999, p. 402) writes, Germany’s federal constitution (Basic Law) assigns
policy responsibility to the federation (Bund) and the states (Länder), depending on the policy
issue concerned. It is important to note the important role the Länder play in Germany’s
legislative and administrative set-up: article 70 (1) of the Basic Law for example stipulates
that the Länder have the right to legislate when the mentioned Basic Law does not confer
legislative power on the Federation. In fact, the Länder act as Germany’s principal
administrators, and carry out two-thirds of total public expenditure. German federalism is
therefore a highly cooperative form of government (Benz, 1994). Regional policy decisions
are taken in the framework of the “joint tasks” (Gemeinschaftsausgaben), a structure which
has become the trademark of Germany’s cooperative federalism. It is a structure exemplary of
what Scharpf et al. (1976) have termed Politikverflechtung (a system of interlocking
competencies).
The question if cooperative federalism is endangered since the beginning of the 1990s still has
to be researched through various interviews and readings. However, recent research on the
relationship between the Länder and the EU tend to assess that the cooperative federalism has
rather been reinforced (T. Börzel). Case studies will help understanding with more details
these growing interconnections between the Bund, the Länder and the EU levels, which
characterise what we call the multi-bilateral assistance policy to CEEC.
B – Case studies: how do the various actors of the German assistance make the link
between bilateral and multilateral assistance networks?
Most of the case studies in European questions focus on precise sectors: finance, EMU,
environment, etc… In our case studies, we prefer studying how coordination of the aid takes
place around a particular topic, rather than focusing on a precise sector. We will argue that
51 Interviews at the representation office of Mecklenburg-Vorpommern in Tallinn, April 2000. Also FISCHER Thomas
(2002).27
coordination only effectively began since the opening of negotiations in 1997. That is why we
focus on the last years of the implementation of assistance programs.
We identified following topics as being representative of the difficult coordination process
taking place between European and national actors of different – sometimes competing –
sectors:
1) institution-building (infrastructure, ministries, etc…)
2) transfer of norms:
- law transfer, build the state of law
- education: develop the markets, educate the elites of tomorrow (EU civil servants)
In this paper, we only present the first case, i.e. on the links between the German bilateral and
the European assistance programs.
Dealing with Twinning: an institution-building program
Discussions as well as an evaluation report of the implementation of the Phare program from
1989 to 1998 gave birth in 1998 to new guidelines for Phare: since the CEEC committed
themselves to future accession to the EU, Phare would no longer be demand-driven but
accession-driven. The Accession Partnership, signed with each candidate country in 1998, are
“key feature of the revised Phare program, since they lay down the short-term and medium-
term priorities for each country in the accession process” (p. 7).
The new Phare orientations focus essentially on two types of support: institution-building and
investment support, in particular for rehabilitating/modernisation infrastructure. There are two
types of institution-building projects: Twinning and technical assistance.
What is Twinning?
Twinning was created in 1997 in order to make available the expertise
52 of member state
practitioners and help administrations of East European countries to implement the acquis
52 The EU Commission has a large and vague definition of expertise: “Given the range of sectors and priorities targeted by
the Phare Programme across all the partner countries, there is no typical expert, but there is instead a typical contract for
the provision of the expertise needed in each individual case. Expertise is provided by international companies and
organisations, European federations, national institutes, universities, consultancies, NGOs and individuals. There is no28
communautaire. A network of National Contact Points was established to work with the
Commission: Each member-state and each candidate country appointed a person to represent
them, to liase with their own administration and to ensure the flow of information through the
network. Twinning precisely consists in the long-term secondment (over 12 months) of one or
more Pre-Accession Advisors (PAA) from a Ministry or other approved body in a member
state to work on a project in the corresponding Ministry in a candidate country
53, but it also
includes short-term expertise, training, services (translation, interpreting) and specialised help
like on compute software (technical assistance). In 1998, the Twinning projects focused on
the same four key areas of the acquis in each candidate country: agriculture, environment,
finance, and justice and home affairs. In 1999, preparatory measures for the implementation
of the structural founds was added as a topic. For the Commission, “Twinning reflects a
change in the Commission’s approach to assistance, on the basis that these countries are
becoming members of the EU”. We especially want to stress on the fact that in the new
strategy, a stronger role was attributed to national advisors: “The best way of [putting the
basic structures into place] is to use civil servants from the Member States to provide advice
and training to local civil servants”, explains the official EU document. Interviews with
German administrative experts revealed that in fact, the attempt of the Commission to become
an administration independent from the member-states failed, as consulting companies and
technical comities working for the Commission did not have the sufficient knowledge on
showing how a state is working.
Which connections between the German assistance community and the EU?
The case of the EU Twinning program is representative of the bargaining process taking place
between the European Commission, which tries to have a regulative role for the attribution of
projects, and the actors of EU member states who try to show that national expertise and
experience is not dead. It particularly shows the important role of already existing bilateral
relations for the integration within multilateral programs. Before the evaluation in 1997,
“various governments proposed projects themselves to the European Commission. As long as
they met the Phare objectives, projects could be in any fields or sector for varying amounts
and for whatever purpose. This led to numerous small projects, which made for enormous
complications and time-consuming activities by the project managers” (p. 6). As the German
particular advantage in being large or small, or in having any particular corporate format.” EU Commission (DG1A), How
to work with Phare, Brussels, May 1999.
53 EU Commission, The Phare Programme. Annual Report 1998, Brussels, 31.03.2000. COM (2000) 183 final, p. 8.29
Transform program already helped to develop a vast network of bilateral relations with
candidate states, it may be noticed how it helped the same actors (mostly national agencies) to
be good positioned within the Phare program. The first year, in 1998, the EU Commission
presented 152 projects: the German government made 123 propositions and could participate
to 57 of them (under which 33 with the statute of project leader). In comparison, France and
the UK, the more active countries in the fields of assistance to CEEC, respectively proposed
81 and 57 projects, but won 40 (F) and 23 (UK) of them. Because of the preponderant
position of German actors (they won more than a third of the projects) the EU Commission
regulated between 1999 and 2002 the attribution of Twinning co-operations in selecting less
German projects and more from other EU countries
54. Nevertheless, German participation to
the Twinning program stays very high: a total of 132 Twinning projects were lead or
implemented by German actors between 1998 and 2000
55. It is nevertheless interesting to
notice that the regional and sector-related repartition of the projects is somehow the reverse
m i r r o ro ft h eTransform program: it concentrates on CEE countries and especially on sectors
which, for the most of them, are now out the Transform program. This is the case of Estonia,
the Czech Republic, Hungary, Bulgaria and Romania, and of the activities of the Ministries of
Interior (BMI), of Environment (BMU), of Labour and social Questions (BMA), of Health
(BMG), etc…and their related organizations
56. Interviews with German civil servants
revealed that some actors, for example of the social and environmental sectors which could
not face the monopoly of Transform’s triumvirat – composed by Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
Ministry of Economy, Ministry of economic Co-operation – thus found an escape door at the
European level in order to keep their consulting activities in CEEC
57. In this sense, European
programs offered a political opportunity window for actors with a lower position at the
national level
58. But we still need to understand through interviews if Twinning gives way to
renewed co-operation between the Bund and the Länder. The Ministry of Finance and the
GTZ (governmental organization working for the Ministry of Development), representing the
54 Interview at the Federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs, department for the EU-negociations and the co-ordination of
European assistance projects, Berlin, February 2001.
55 In comparison, France won 104 projects, the UK 75, Spain 59, Sweden 53 and Austria 42. EUROPEAN COMMISSION,
“Meeting of National Contact Points”, Working-paper on Twinning projects, Brussels, 24 January 2001. (not published). See
also: BMF, „Twinning-Verwaltungspartnerschaft mit den Beitrittsländern Mittel- und Osteuropa“, Monatsbericht des BMF,
März 2002, pp. 53-56.
56 EU COMMISSION, “Meeting of National Contact Points”, op. cit. BMF, „Twinning-Verwaltungspartnerschaft...“, op. cit.,
p. 53.
57 Federal Ministry of Finance, interview with a civil servant responsible for the co-ordination of Transform and EU
programmes, Berlin, February 2001.
58 The concept of opportunity window is a public policy concept. See also: NENTWICH Michael, “ Opportunity Structures
for Citizens’ Participation : The Case of the European Union ”, European Integration Online Papers (EioP), (1), 1996.
http://eiop.or.at/eiop/texte/1996-001a.htm30
Bund, are leading the Co-ordination Office of Twinning. It seems that the coordination has
especially reinforced cooperation between the Bund and the new Bundesländer. As a matter
of fact, Saxony, Brandenburg and Mecklenburg-Vorpommern obtained a leading role for the
implementation of respectively 22, 17 and 10 projects (1998-2000), especially on the field of
agriculture. Bavaria (13) and Baden-Württemberg (8), which hare traditionally well
represented at various European institutions, and have already developed strong bilateral
contacts with CEEC, also prove very active
59. In this sense, it would be interesting to analyse
furthermore how German federal system is restructuring in the context of EU enlargement.
One point is nevertheless important to notice: Transform’s actors oriented their activity
towards Twinning not only for financial, but also identity reasons. For them, the main priority
is to keep already existing projects and initiate new ones, in order to keep their organisational
and sometimes national identity norms. The way integration is taking place between national
and European programs then depends on the sector analysed: Some resist to the
implementation of European norms, other do not. The following actors of traditional ones of
the German Ostpolitik, are, most of the time, the most integrated ones at the EU level, but
also the ones who defend promotion of national-experience the most at the implementation
stage.
Nevertheless, Twinning as well as European/multilateral programs are heavily criticised on
both West and East parts: for the donor organisations and PAAs, Twinning is not flexible
enough, procedures (tenders, etc…) are long, and the costs of local living conditions of PAAs
(hotels, restaurants…) are sometimes considered as a way of wasting money. All experts
agree on the fact that the German program Transform, i.e. direct bilateral relations, was more
flexible, quicker and less expensive. It particularly helped to develop projects around the
transfer of norms, ways of doing (write a tender…), but also to think of common ways of
working through regular contacts.
Conclusion: towards governance or a sui generis multi-bilateral enlargement?
In this article, we tried to show that the Eastern enlargement is not a regime, nor a real foreign
policy, but a sui generis process: thus EU member state’s policies are not disappearing, but
59 BMF, Monatsbericht des BMF, März 2002, p. 55.31
restructuring within European sector-oriented networks. This restructuring process entails
“internal” as well as “external” logics, which are mutually constitutive: The federal level
(Bund) delegates the implementation to various actors of development policy, particularly to
half-public and (often economic) non-state actors, in order to win legitimacy. As the federal
level (Bund) and the regions (Länder) also redefined their respective competences on foreign
cooperation, the new nature of German “cooperative federalism” still needs to be further
researched. In general, as coordination processes do not work the way they should do, doubt
may stay open on the democratic aspect of this policy. Iintegration of national actors at the
EU level rather works when they officially adopt the European discourse (political process),
but nevertheless keep their own identity and promote it for the implementation of projects
(administrative process), without having any big accounts to give. This is what we call multi-
bilateral enlargement policy: European programs are built on national and bilateral
experiences, which are called European in the form, but stay national in praxis. For this
purpose, German federal and regional actors developed strategies in order to integrate the EU
institutional networks of assistance, defend their positions and identities on specific questions,
and keep bilateral confident relations developed through national bilateral projects. Lack of
communication drive to some inconsistencies and contradictions, therefore to difficulties of
coordination at the EU as well as in the CEEC. Bilateral programs nowadays are a mean to
develop or keep bilateral contacts, to make them later legitimised at the EU level.
We argue that a more effective coordination between national and European policies did not
take place before the opening of negotiations in 1998. Until an important evaluation of the
Phare program in 1997, the European Commission also tried to develop its own autonomy
from national actors, asking for the expertise of independent technical comities and consulting
companies working for the EU. Rather strange, case studies show that recent attempts to
better coordinate European and national resources tend to reallocate legitimacy to national
institutions and organisations of EU member states. Last programs, like Twinning, defend the
principle of subsidiarity, and thus intend to give a growing role to regional (Länder)
administration within the process of enlargement.
Therefore, it is difficult to speak of governance as hierarchy still plays a role within the
decision-process and implementation of the assistance to CEEC. We would rather say that
poor coordination processes around a precise thematic leaves way to national, regional and
private initiatives, and still drive to incoherent and competitive activities. Therefore, we
would not claim that the state is dead: we have to take into account that we simply do not
speak of the same state anymore. It is now most of the time identified to the governmental32
apparatus, which also lost many traditional functions. As the growing technical questions are
being delegated to half-state and private actors, power distribution has also become different:
Governmental and ministerial actors now mainly have a coordination role, and try through
delegation and stronger cooperation with the Länder, to keep an eye on every sector of
activity. Therefore, communication in all sectors, preparation of national opinions, bringing
actors of different sectors together, and especially making the promotion of the federal state,
have for sure become one of their last main and long-lasting tasks of governmental actors
within what has become a multi-bilateral enlargement policy.33
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Annexes:
Annex 1
Official budget of Germany’s assistance to CEEC and NIS between 1990 and 2000 (Million DM):
Year 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Budget 112 212,5 299,4 300 300 300 285 178 150 130 110 90 70
Source : BMWi, Fünf Jahre TRANSFORM, Beratung für Mittel- und Osteuropa, Bilanz und Ausblick, Bonn, BMWi, KfW, Juni 1998.
+I n t e r v i e w sB M W i ,B M Z ,B M F .
Annex 2
Break down year by year of the EU PHARE funds committed in the period 1990-1998 (EUR million):
Year 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
Budget 493 758,9 996,2 998,4 966,9 1 153,3 1 222,5 1 147,7 1 153,9
Source: EU Commission, The Phare Programme. Annual Report 1998, Brussels, 31.03.2000. COM (2000) 183 final, p. 21.
Annex 3
Sectoral distribution of Transform’s annual budget (1998) In %
Commercial sector 46 %
Training and qualifications 12 %
Financial sector 9%
Consulting on governmental and law activities 8 %
Agricultural sector 7 %
Research 7%
Administrative institution building 5 %
Labour, social, health 4 %
Environment 2%
Source : BMWi, Die Beratung Mittel- und Osteuropas beim Aufbau von Demokratie und sozialer Marktwirtschaft. Konzept und
Beratungsprogramme der Bundesregierung, Fortschreibung 1998, (439), mai 1998, Bonn, BMWi. BMWi Dokumentation, p. 23.
Annex 4
Regional repartition of Transform’s annual budget (1997) :
Russia : 26% Czech Republic : 3%
Ukraine : 11% Slovakia : 4%
Bielorussia : 5% Estonia : 3%
Poland : 9% Latvia : 3%
Hungary : 6% Lithuania : 3%
Bulgaria : 6% Other : 21%
Source : BMWi, Fünf Jahre TRANSFORM, Beratung für Mittel- und Osteuropa, Bilanz und Ausblick, Bonn, BMWi, KfW, Juni 1998.